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The United States (US) and some of its allies continue to assert that their foreign policy towards North 
Korea (NK) is one of positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, punishment and omission training. 
Or more simply the carrot and the stick. This policy can best be described through two options. 
 
Option 1. If the NK government minimizes or stops nuclear weapons development, proliferation of the 
technology and/or components of weapons of mass destruction, various weapons testing activities, and 
other behaviors perceived as undesirable by the US and its allies, then the NK government will 
experience consequences that it will perceive as positive and that will increase the probability that 
further minimization and stopping of undesired behavior (from the perspective of the US and its allies) 
will occur. These positive consequences will either be given or applied to NK (positive reinforcement) or 
be constituted by the taking away of conditions that are perceived by NK to be negative (negative 
reinforcement.) 
 
Option 2. If the NK government continues with behavior undesired by the US and its allies, then NK will 
experience consequences that it will perceive as negative and that will also increase the probability that 
minimization and stopping of undesired behavior (from the perspective of the US and its allies) will 
occur. These negative consequences will either be given or applied to NK (punishment) or be constituted 
by the taking away of conditions that are perceived by NK to be positive (omission training.) 
 
Unfortunately, these options do not seem to be effective--a failure best attributed not to 
misunderstanding but to application. A behavior analyst can strongly argue from the NK perspective that 
positive and negative reinforcement occur after and are elicited by NK behavior that is undesired--not 
desired--by the US and the latter's allies. For example the reinforcements are perceived by the NK to 
occur after a crisis has been engendered not resolved. Again from the NK perspective, punishment and 
omission training occur after and is elicited by behavior that concurrently (or nearly so) is followed by 
positive and negative reinforcement greater in consequence than the punishment and omission training 
in question. For example, it often is more reinforcing to the NK for it to continue with behavior 
undesired by the US and its allies--regardless of what the US and its allies can offer. 
 
A behavior analyst can strongly argue that the conditioning reality from the perspective of the US and its 
allies is quite different from that of the NK. This should come as no surprise to philosophers of science. 
The biggest problem confronting a behaviorist conditioning approach has long been the contention that 
a so-called mind--e.g., intrapsychic phenomena--is either nonexistent or irrelevant to effective 
conditioning (the occasional theoretical synthesis of mind and behavior to the contrary.) Meanwhile the 
testing of the Taepodong 2 and other NK behaviors undesired by the US and its allies--and some of their 
adversaries and neutrals as well--grow ever closer. Is not a meeting of the minds in order? (See Bandura, 
A. (1996). Ontological and epistemological terrains revisited. Journal of Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry, 27, 323-345; Foxall, G.R. (1998). Radical behaviorist interpretation: Generating 
and evaluating an account of consumer behavior. Behavior Analyst, 21, 321-354; Garcia, J. (1996). The 
Darwinian status of mind. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 27, 347-350; North 
Korea's dangerous missiles. (August 5, 1999). the New York Times, p. A22; Place, U.T. (1997). Linguistic 
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behaviorism and the correspondence theory of truth. Behavior and Philosophy, 25, 83-94; Plaud, J.J., & 
Vogeltanz, N.D. (1997). Back to the future: The continued relevance of behavior theory to modern 
behavior therapy. Behavior Therapy, 28, 403-414.) (Keywords: Conditioning, International Relations, 
North Korea.) 
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